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Introduction
This dissertation is composed of three related essays. The first one investigates
observed regional wage differentials in Switzerland, while the other two focuses on
the Swiss border Canton of Ticino analyzing wage differentials between natives and
foreigners and the impact that cross–border commuters may have on the wages of
the local labor supply.
The interest in explaining wage differentials in labor economics is closely related
to the incomplete description of the labor market provided by the basic neoclassical
theory. The basic model of competitive labor markets implies that as long as work-
ers or firms can freely enter and exit the marketplace, there will be a single wage in
the economy. This result was based, on the restrictive assumptions of perfect com-
petition, free factor mobility, and homogeneity of firms and workers. Therefore, new
theories have been developed in order to better describe the labor market behavior
to explain wage differentials.
In the context of this dissertation, it is important to underline the relevant role of
the theory of equalizing differences. This theory that dates back to Smith (1776) and
subsequently formalized by Friedman and Kuznets (1945) and Friedman (1962) has
generated considerable theoretical and empirical interest to exploit the existence of
wage disparities among individuals. Reviewed by Rosen (1986), the theory refers to
observed wage differentials required to equalize the total monetary and nonmonetary
advantages or disadvantages among work activities and among workers themselves.
In its basic framework, activities that offer favorable working conditions attract labor
at lower than average wages, whereas jobs offering unfavorable working conditions
must pay premiums as offsetting compensation in order to attract workers.
The compensating principle has inspired the development of two important eco-
nomic models, the human capital theory and the hedonic wage approach. These
theories have played an important role for both the theoretical interpretation of the
wage differences and for the development of the earnings wage function as empirical
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instrument widely applied in the economic literature.
The human capital theory postulates that individual expenditures on training
and education should be considered as an investment to increase personal future
income. The theoretical insight of the human capital theory was first developed by
Mincer (1958, 1962) and Becker (1964, 1975) in an extension of Friedman and
Kuznets (1945) analysis of income differences among independent workers, and
successively extended by Mincer (1974) who had the merit to develop the standard
human capital earnings function.
The hedonic approach, as explained by Kumar and Coates (1982), focuses on
“quality” variation in both worker and job attributes as an explanation for wage
differences. The essay of Rosen (1974) provides an important general framework
for the hedonic price theory while successively Thaler and Rosen (1975) extended
this approach to the labor market viewed for the first time as an hedonic market.
The empirical studies in this literature typically estimate the hedonic wage function
by correlating a workers wage with various job characteristics, after adjusting for
other factors, such as differences in skills, human capital, that might generate wage
differentials among workers.
Moreover, Rosen (1986) shows that the theory of equalizing differentials has
found its earliest and most widespread use in the economic theory of discrimination
which is viewed as arising from specific preferences for association with identifiable
groups in the workplace. The modern economic analysis of discrimination can be
traced back to Becker (1957) and his concept of taste discrimination. As underlined
by Borjas (2002), in Becker’s approach, a prejudiced person incorporates race,
national origin, and gender of market participants in the long list of disadvantages
that influence the value of the exchange. The labor market, therefore, may have to
generate differentials to compensate prejudiced persons for their utility loss or gain.
There is a wide range of empirical analysis on labor market discrimination1.
1See the survey provided by Cain (1986).
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One of the most important contributions has been provided by Blinder (1973) and
Oaxaca (1973). They developed a methodology to decompose observed average
wage differentials among two groups into two components: a wage differential due
to skills and a wage differential due to market discrimination.
In this dissertation, the special interest in the Swiss case arises from its small
scale, its federalist structure, its geographical position, its high share of immigrant
workers and its strong regional wage disparities.
The small scale of the country and the ensuing short distance between the re-
gional labor markets should provoke an important mobility of the labor force, on
the one hand, and promote spatial concentration and differentiation of economic
structure among regions, on the other. The former will tend to minimize regional
wage differentials, the latter will tend to increase them.
The federalist system of Switzerland, based on historical differences in language,
culture and religion, will impose a cost on internal migration contributing to wage
differences among regions but it will also reduce barriers for the integration of for-
eigners coming from the neighboring countries.
The location of Switzerland in the center of Europe without being member of
the EU implies that wages can be greatly influenced by trans-border labor markets
which are of different relevance for the various regions.
Switzerland historically has a high share of immigrant workers that increases
in Swiss border Cantons due to the possibility to hire cross-border commuters. In
2002, foreigners accounted for a quarter of the Swiss manpower even if the access
of immigrant labor force has always been limited by a system of quotas and by
permits for foreigners that have been conceded only in absence of equivalent local
labor supply.
Since 1st June 2002 the Swiss labor market is experiencing a transition period
where the Free Movement of Persons between Switzerland and the European Union
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member states will be gradually introduced and fully implemented within 12 years2.
This change removes the most important instrument that has been used by Switzer-
land to control the immigration inflow, especially in Swiss border Cantons.
One of these border regions is the Canton Ticino which represents an interesting
case of analysis. Ticino is a Swiss Canton on the north Italian border with 160’000
workers (4% of Switzerland) with twice the national share of foreign workers (41% in
2000 in Ticino, 25% in Switzerland). This is due to the possibility to employ foreign
cross-border commuters coming from the North Italian Provinces whose share in the
foreign employment in Ticino is 50%. This category of foreign workers has never
been limited by quotas but regulated through geographical restrictions.
The neighboring Italian Provinces represent an “infinite” source of manpower
for Ticino3, that can be attracted by existing wage differentials. Due to the similar
cultures between Ticino and the Italian Provinces (same language, and similar ed-
ucational systems) the human capital is easily transferable. However cross–border
commuters earn, ceteris paribus, less than Swiss workers. For these reasons, the
Canton Ticino’s situation represents an interesting extreme case of analysis in view
of a complete liberalization of the Swiss labor market.
The heterogeneity of the Swiss labor market and the strong wage disparities
among regions motivate the study presented in the first essay. Inter-regional wage
differentials are a matter of great interest that have been studied for several countries
such as the USA by Gerking and Weirick (1983), Spain by Garc´ıa and Molina
(2002), Portugal by Vieira et al. (2005), and Switzerland by Rochira and Rosas
(2005). Switzerland represents a typical case in which Zurich plays the role of the
strong economic center that prevails among the other Swiss regions for its strong
economic structure and its high concentration of human capital. In 2002, the wage
in the Canton of Zurich was between 8% and 29% above the average Swiss level.
2The national priority has been abolished in June 2004 while the quotas will be abolished in
June 2007.
3The employment basin of the neighboring Italian Provinces counts around 1 million workers
that can potentially apply for a cross–border commuter working permit.
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The purpose of this study is twofold: firstly, average observed wage differential
between Zurich and the other Swiss regions are decomposed into a part due to the
different characteristics of the labor force (endowment component) and one due to
different remuneration of identical characteristics (remuneration component); sec-
ondly, and more interestingly, the contribution of each explanatory variable to the
two components is identified, thus relating endowment and remuneration differen-
tials to individual characteristics.
Two streams of literature have to be considered in this context. The first one
follows the hedonic wage theory of Rosen (1986), while the second follows Blinder
(1973) and Oaxaca (1973) wage differentials decomposition. As shown by Jones
(1983), Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) and Horrace and Oaxaca (2001), application
of the Blinder-Oaxaca methodology provokes an identification problem when at-
tempting to estimate a detailed decomposition using sets of dummy variables. Yun
(2005) developed a technique in order to solve the identification problem. Applying
the latter methodology has the advantage to measure not only a detailed decompo-
sition but also to reorganize the results in a more suitable way. The aggregation of
the variables in categories as human capital, socioeconomic characteristics and job
and firm characteristics is useful in the interpretation of the results. This appears
specially relevant when analyzing wage differentials among regions rather than by
ethnicity or gender where the focus is in the measurement of the total discriminatory
component.
The results show that with respect to the richest Swiss region, Zurich, the aver-
age wage differentials appear rather balanced among both components except for the
Lake of Geneva Region where the endowment component largely prevails. Among
the factors that cause such wage differentials individual characteristics play an im-
portant role in the remuneration component, while the job and firm characteristics
mainly influence the endowment component. In particular, human capital variables
are the most important causes of the bias, not because Swiss regions show differences
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in the human capital levels but in its remuneration. This seems to indicate a limited
geographical mobility of the labor force due to the characteristics of Switzerland ex-
plained above. In contrast, endowment depends mainly on economic structure and
type of occupation. Especially stronger economic regions can compensate disadvan-
tages from endowment through remuneration of human capital attracting mobile
foreign labor force.
The second essay decomposes the wage differential between natives and foreign
permit groups in the Canton Ticino considering a segmentation of the labor market
by tasks into a deterministic and an unexplained component. Following the pio-
neering study by Piore (1973) and successively extended by Bulow and Summers
(1986), when separating the market by tasks it is implicitly assumed that the mar-
ket behaves differently relative to skill segments. The reasonable assumption that
high skill workers would likely be employed in the high task segment, allows the
comparison of the wage gap decomposition across segments and types of permit for
workers employed in similar tasks
However, two sources of selection bias make the comparison of the wages between
native and foreign workers difficult. The first is related to the selection based on ob-
servables: different characteristics and different distribution of these characteristics,
while the second comes from the selection based on unobservables: differences across
the different groups like unobserved abilities, incentives to migrate, discrimination
and others. There is a large literature that has been focusing on selection when
considering the wage gap between natives and immigrants, the main contribution
stemming from Borjas (1994) who explains immigrants self selection and the deci-
sion to migrate based on relative advantages. Moreover, selection can arise due to
immigration policies of the host country. The unobserved bias can be attributable
not only to incentives to migrate and to the local policies but also to integration
problems, skills, language, living costs and discrimination.
In this paper two methodologies have been adopted in order to decompose the
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wage differential between Swiss and foreigners. The first is the usual Blinder-Oaxaca
parametric approach, and the second a nonparametric technique using a propensity
score matching approach developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The two
methodologies produce a slightly different decomposition but the overall conclu-
sions remain the same. In general, the results show that human capital plays an
important role in explaining the wage differentials especially in the low task seg-
ment. When including the whole set of variables, in general from 15% to one third
is attributable to the unexplained component in both the task segments except for
two cases, i.e. cross–borders in low task segment and annuals in high task segment,
where 40% and 60% of the observed wage gap are attributable to the unexplained
component respectively. The Canton Ticino shows a scarcity of human resources on
the local labor market (not surprisingly given the high share of foreigners). Foreign
workers show a different distribution of characteristic depending on the permit to
work. Annuals are much more similar in the high task segment to Swiss workers
than permanent and cross–borders than are less skilled. In the low task segment,
foreigners appear less skilled than Swiss workers. Cross–border commuters are al-
ways the least paid group with highest unexplained negative penalty suggesting that
for high skill jobs, local firms could not find the required skills in the neighboring
region.
Finally the third essay tries to verify if cross–border commuters generate a pres-
sure on the wages of Swiss and resident immigrant workers in Ticino. This category
of foreign workers has never been limited by quotas but regulated through geo-
graphical restrictions. Cross-border commuters must reside in a bounded region of
no more than 30 km from the Swiss border line4. Moreover, they can be employed
only in a predefined Swiss border area5, where cross-border commuters can compete
with local workers, and distinguish it from a region where they cannot be employed.
4A North–Italian worker must reside in the Italian border region at least 6 month previous to
the application for cross–border working permit.
5A cross–border commuter who resides in Northern Italy is allowed to work only in the south
part of Switzerland.
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The possibility to distinguish these two areas in Ticino is the key to the analysis.
Taking into account immigration endogeneity as well as the limited mobility of local
labor supply, comparing local worker wages across the regulatory discontinuity it is
possible to measure the cross-border commuters wage pressure on the native wages.
The impact of immigration in Switzerland has been analyzed by several authors.
Following production theory developed by Christensen et al. (1971), applications to
the Swiss case have been provided by Butare and Favarger (1992) and by Sheldon
(2000) finding that immigrants have little negative effects on Swiss workers’ wages.
Authors as Golder and Straubhaar (1999) provide evidence that immigrants tend
to have a negative impact on the Swiss economy.
In the U.S. context, a more recent contribution by Ottaviano and Peri (2006),
developing a general equilibrium framework in an extension of Borjas (2003), con-
cluded that in presence of differentiated labor, the inflow of immigrants belonging to
a certain group can be expected to have asymmetric impacts on the wage of different
native groups: a negative effect on groups with substitutable characteristics and a
positive effect on groups with complementary characteristics. This paper focuses
on the expected negative effect cross–border commuters may have on local labor
supply, because the intention of the author is to identify which group of the local
labor force may be more susceptible to suffer from negative consequences, and to
quantify this penalty.
The results show significant wage disparities between low skill workers employed
in the two regions. Only a small group of Swiss workers seem to be affected by this
pressure because the cross–border commuters attracted in Ticino are low skilled and
therefore more similar to resident immigrants. Finally, this study permits to reflect
upon the possible impacts the liberalization may have on the Swiss labor market.
The Canton Ticino represents an extreme case of analysis where a high concentration
of cross–border commuters produces only small effects on natives, but the impact
on other foreign categories of workers could be more problematic.
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This dissertation analyzes three issues relative to wage differentials that are
of general interest, it investigates wage differentials among regions, and between
workers origins, and the impact foreign workers may have on native wages.
The applied methodologies represent a relevant contribution to the economic lit-
erature in three respects. First, the reinterpretation of the Blinder-Oaxaca approach
to analyze regional wage differentials represents a useful instrument to identify the
factors at the origin of such disparities. Then, the application of nonparametric
methodologies, i.e. the propensity score matching, to analyze wage discrimination
by origins adds more evidence to a new stream of literature developed in recent
years. Finally, this dissertation also provides a study on cross-border commuters, a
topic that finds very few references in the economic literature.
The results obtained evidence the important role of the human capital to explain
wage differentials among regions and between origin groups. It is found evidence that
foreign workers in Ticino do not suffer systematically a wage penalization relative
to natives, specially when considering high skill temporary immigrants. However,
cross-border commuters are the lowest paid group generating wage pressure on low
skill workers that is more likely to affect other foreign workers than Swiss. Therefore,
all these results permit to reflect on the possible impact the liberalization may have
on the Swiss labor market.
In what follows, it is first presented the analysis of wage differentials among Swiss
regions, then the investigation relative to wage disparities between Swiss workers
and foreigners in Ticino, and finally the contribution that investigates the impact
of cross-border commuters on native wages in the Canton of Ticino.
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Abstract
This paper analyses wage differentials between Zurich (the economic center) and the other
regions of Switzerland. We decompose the regional wage differentials in two components
(i.e. endowment and remuneration) applying a method proposed by Yun (2005) in an
extension of the Blinder–Oaxaca methodology which solves the identification problem of
detailed differential decomposition. The results show that with respect to the richest Swiss
region, Zurich, the wage differentials appear rather balanced among the two components.
Among the factors that cause such disparities, human capital plays an important role in
the remuneration component, while economic structure influences the endowment compo-
nent.
JEL classification: J31, R12
Keywords: Regional wage differentials, Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition
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1.1 Introduction
The process of spatial concentration in a country is closely related to important wage dif-
ferentials. In most countries rich urbanizations tend to concentrate activities and attract
competences from poor peripheries generating regional disparities rather than processes
of convergence. Literature on spatial agglomeration provides evidence that workers em-
ployed in urban density earn more than workers in nonurban areas. Authors as Krugman
(1991) and Ciccone and Hall (1996) demonstrate that higher urban productivity can be
related to the interaction of transport costs and scale economies. Alternative approaches
as in Glaeser (1999), Rauch (1993) and Ciccone and Peri (2006) investigate human
capital externalities in cities as explanation for differences in productivity between core
and periphery. However, the question to what extent wage differentials are due to the
economic differentiation process as such, to the presence of competitive firms in the center
or rather to higher wages paid for human capital remains an issue to be explored.
This article analyses observed average wage differentials among Swiss regions. Inter–
regional wage differentials are a matter of great interest that have been studied for several
countries such as the USA by Gerking and Weirick (1983), Spain by Garc´ıa and Molina
(2002), Portugal by Vieira et al. (2005), and Switzerland by Rochira and Rosas (2005).
The special interest in the Swiss case arises from its strong regional wage disparities,
its geographical position, its small scale and its federalist structure, but also because it
represents a typical case in which Zurich plays the role of the strong economic center1
that prevails among the other Swiss regions for its strong economic structure and its high
concentration of human capital. In 2002, the wage in the Canton of Zurich was between
8% and 29% above the average Swiss level. The location of Switzerland in the center of
Europe without being member of the EU implies that wages can be greatly influenced
by trans–border labor markets which are of different relevance for the various regions.
The small scale of the country and the ensuing short distance between the regional labor
markets should provoke an important mobility of the labor force, on the one hand, and
promote spatial concentration and differentiation of economic structure among regions,
on the other. The former will tend to minimize wage differentials, the latter will tend to
1Zurich produces 22% of the national GDP and shares 20% of total employment.
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increase them. Finally, the federalist system of Switzerland, based on historical differences
in language, culture and religion, will impose a cost on migration contributing to wage
differences.
It seems therefore promising to decompose the average wage differentials among Swiss
regions: a first component related to the composition of the workforce employed in different
regions, and a second one related to the regional segmentation of the labor market that
remunerates identical characteristics differently.
The purpose of this paper is to perform a detailed decomposition to determine the
contribution of each characteristic (in both the components) to the total observed regional
wage differentials. In particular we want to identify the role played by human capital,
socioeconomic characteristics and economic structure of the markets in the generation of
the regional disparities.
Two streams of literature have to be considered in this context. The first one follows
the hedonic wage theory of Rosen (1986), which states that the wage differentials between
two occupations are given by the compensation due to different job characteristics, which
themselves depend on different human capital requirements or on different working con-
ditions. The second stream of literature follows Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) who
developed a method to decompose wage differences by gender or ethnicity into different
characteristics among individuals and different remuneration of the same characteristics.
As shown by Jones (1983), Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) and Horrace and Oaxaca
(2001), application of the Blinder–Oaxaca methodology provokes an identification prob-
lem when attempting to estimate a detailed decomposition using sets of dummy variables.
Dummy variables in the regression equations do not cause problems in estimating and
decomposing total wage differentials, but generate different results in the detailed remu-
neration effects attributed to dummy variables because these components are not invariant
to the choice of the reference group, arbitrarily chosen by the researcher. In other words,
the problem arises from the lack of direct identification of all group effects when using
n− 1 dummy coefficients and the constant in the regression equations (see Suits (1984)).
Authors like Nielsen (2000), Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2004) and Yun (2005) have de-
veloped techniques to solve the identification problem. Here the “averaging of coefficients”
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method proposed by Yun (2005) is applied, the methodology developed by Nielsen (2000),
proposing OLS regression with transformed dummy variables, being too cumbersome in
presence of several sets of dummy variables (as in our case). The method proposed by
Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2004) produces, under determined constraints, the same results
as the averaging of coefficients method. Applying this latter method thus permits to iden-
tify a coefficient also for the reference category and to perform a complete decomposition
of wage differentials.
In the following, we present the model of wage decomposition proposed by Yun (2005),
describe the data used and the sample characteristics. We then present and discuss the
empirical findings and draw conclusions.
1.2 The wage decomposition
The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, average observed wage differential between
Zurich and the other Swiss regions are decomposed into a part due to the different charac-
teristics of the labor force (endowment component) and one due to different remuneration
of identical characteristics (remuneration component); secondly, and more interestingly,
the contribution of each explanatory variable to the two components is identified, thus
relating endowment and remuneration differentials to individual characteristics.
Following the proposition of Yun (2005) in an extension to the Blinder–Oaxaca
methodology to solve the identification problem, we estimate by ordinary least squares
(OLS) a hedonic wage equation for each Swiss region j as proposed by Mincer (1974):
lnwj = αj +
N∑
n=1
Xjnδ
j
n +
S∑
s=1
Ks∑
ks=2
Djsksβ
j
sks
+ j (1.1)
where lnwj is the gross monthly standardized natural logarithm of wage for the region j. In
equation (1.1), we include N continuous variables Xn (in our case human capital variables)
and S sets of categorical variables Ds each including Ks categories with Ks − 1 dummy
variables (the first category as the reference group)2. Finally α, β and δ are the parameters
2Using the Yun (2005) averaging approach, the choice of the reference group in equation (1.1)
is invariant to the detailed decomposition.
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to be estimated and  is the error with the usual properties.
Adopting the “averaging coefficients” approach, equation (1.1) is transformed into a
new “normalized” regression equation:
lnwj = αj +
S∑
s=1
β
j
s +
N∑
n=1
Xjnδ
j
n +
S∑
s=1
Ks∑
ks=1
Djsks
(
βjsks − β
j
s
)
+ j (1.2)
where βjs =
1
Ks
∑Ks
ks=1
βjsks , and β
j
s1 = 0 (the coefficient for the reference category).
The dummy coefficients resulting from the normalized regression equation show the
deviation of the OLS estimates of the dummy variable from the mean coefficients3.
Then setting β∗sks = β
j
sks
−βjs and α∗j = αj+
∑S
s=1 β
j
s, we can rewrite the “normalized”
regression equation (1.2) as:
lnwj = α∗j +
N∑
n=1
Xjnδ
j
n +
S∑
s=1
Ks∑
ks
Djsksβ
∗j
sks
+ j (1.3)
After estimating the parameters α̂, β̂ and δ̂ from equation (1.1), the normalized regres-
sion equation (1.3) enables us to identify all the coefficients associated with the dummy
variables (including the reference category) and the constant term.
Then applying the Blinder–Oaxaca method to the equation (1.3) taking Zurich4 (z) as
reference region, we decompose the observed mean wage differentials with respect to the
other Swiss regions (r) in two components:
lnwz − lnwr = EC +RC (1.4)
where lnw is the mean of the monthly natural logarithm of wage observed in the respec-
tive regions, EC is the endowment component, and RC is the remuneration component
3Since the β∗sks are a linear combination of the βsks , their variance can be calculated from the
variance–covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients βsks from the equation (1.1).
4Vieira et al. (2005) use the national wage equation as a reference, analyzing consequently
regional wage differentials in deviation to the national wage average. We prefer to use the highest
wage region (i.e. in our case Zurich) as reference which enables us to confront the other labor
market realities with the most important Swiss labor market, rather than with an “inexistent”
average.
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respectively defined as:
EC =
N∑
n=1
δ̂zn
(
X
z
n −Xrn
)
+
S∑
s=1
Ks∑
ks=1
β̂∗zsks
(
D
z
sks −D
r
sks
)
(1.5)
RC = α̂∗z − α̂∗r +
N∑
n=1
X
r
n
(
δ̂zn − δ̂rn
)
+
S∑
s=1
Ks∑
ks=1
D
r
sks
(
β̂∗zsks − β̂∗rsks
)
(1.6)
where X and D are the means of the observed characteristics, the endowment compo-
nent, EC, reflects the part of the wage difference due to workers’ characteristics, while the
remuneration component, RC, shows the wage difference due to the different remuneration
of the individual characteristics.
1.3 Data and descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis is based on data from the Swiss Wage Structure Survey 2002 (or
SWSS) that provides cross section data5. The survey has been implemented by the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) among a representative sample of 45’000 firms (with
more than two employees) reporting individual attributes of 1.1 million individual workers
in Switzerland. The dataset provides gross nominal monthly standardized logarithm of
wages in Swiss Francs6, human capital characteristics in the form of years of schooling7,
potential experience (age minus years of schooling minus six), and years of tenure in
the current firm. We also controlled for ten sets of dummy variables that describe the
economic structure (four type of contracts, five hierarchical levels, four levels of task
required by firms, seven classes by firm size, 24 sectors8 and 24 occupations) and individual
socioeconomic characteristics (gender, marital status, five categories of part time work and
5In German the survey is called “Schweizerische Lohnstrukturerhebung (LSE)”.
6The SFSO provides individual nominal October’s 2002 gross wages in Swiss Francs standard-
ized to 4 and 1/3 weeks at 40 hours and including 1/12 of an annual bonus where applicable.
Real wages would be much more appropriate in such analysis because it considers different cost of
living that may arise between regions. Unfortunately a consumption price index is not available
at regional level limiting our analysis.
7The SWSS dataset provides a categorical variable describing the highest scholarly degree ob-
tained by each worker. In order to estimate the return on years of schooling, the categorical
variable has been transformed attributing the number of years necessary to achieve the respective
degree.
8The sectors are defined according to the official general classification of economic activities used
in Switzerland, i.e. NOGA 2002 (in French: “Nomenclature Ge´ne´rale des Activite´s E´conomiques”).
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five types of permits for foreigners).
We dispose of a SWSS sample that includes only firms active in the private sector,
and have selected those individual observations which include all the variables used in
the wage equations. The result is a representative sample of 784’139 available individual
observations of occupied workers.
The SWSS 2002 survey is the first since its creation in 1996 that allows to decompose
the entire Swiss sample in seven large regional sub–samples: the economically strong
regions of Zurich (ZH), North Western Switzerland (NWS) and Lake of Geneva Region
(LGR), the economically weak regions of Eastern Switzerland (ES), Espace Mitteland
(EM) and Ticino (TI), and the periphery of Zurich represented by Central Switzerland
(CS)9.
Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics of selected variables10 for the seven regional
sub–samples. Comparing the regions, Zurich pays, on average, the highest monthly wage
and shows important wage differentials even relative to the other strong regions. The
lowest wage gaps are observed in NorthWestern Switzerland and in Lake of Geneva Region,
respectively 8% and 9% (in log terms), while the gap rises to 12% in Central Switzerland
and to much higher percentages in the other weak regions: Eastern Switzerland 17%,
Espace Mitteland 18%, and in Ticino 29%.
Considering the human capital components, it is important to note that the Swiss
regions show similar but statistically different levels of years of education, experience and
tenure11. The only remarkable difference is the low average level of years of tenure in the
region of Zurich, probably due to higher incentives on workers’ turnover as compared to
the other Swiss regions.
The economic structure reveals interesting regional specificities that oppose the strongest
9The seven Swiss regions are composed by the following Swiss Cantons: Zurich: Zurich; North–
Western Switzerland: Basel–City, Basel–Country, Aargau; Lake of Geneva Region: Vaud, Valis,
Geneva; Central Switzerland: Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Obwalden, Nidwalden, Zug; Eastern Switzer-
land: Glarus, Schaffausen, Appenzell A. Rh., Appenzell I. Rh., St. Gallen, Graubunden, Thurgau;
Espace Mitteland: Berne, Fribourg, Solothurn, Neuchaˆtel, Jura; Ticino: Ticino.
10A detailed descriptive table with all the variables included in the model is available from the
authors on request.
11T–test of equal means show that the mean values of Zurich are statistically different at the
99% level from the mean values observed in the other regions. The detailed results are available
from the authors.
22 USI
Oscar Gonzalez 1.4. Empirical results
economic regions to the weakest economies. With respect to industry composition, Zurich
and the Lake of Geneva Region are respectively the first and the second financial places
in Switzerland, and show the high share of workers in the computer industry and related
activities, while North Western Switzerland (thanks to the Canton of Basel) shows rele-
vant employment shares in the chemical industry. On the other hand, the weak economic
regions show high shares of employment in manufacturing activities. Not surprisingly, the
rich economic regions also show lower shares of repetitive tasks required by firms and high
shares of very large firms.
Other interesting socioeconomic characteristics are the high share of non–unionized
workers in Zurich (72% of total employment) and the lowest one (below 50%) in Ticino -
a region with a minority of Swiss workers (43%) and a 30% of cross–border commuters.
1.4 Empirical results
Table 1.2 illustrates the results of the decomposition of the wage differentials by region as
a percentage of the observed wage differential (and in percentage points in parenthesis),
taking Zurich as reference. For every region, the first column shows the percentage of the
observed wage differential explained by each characteristic. Therefore, the total of the first
column is always one hundred of the observed unadjusted mean wage differential. The
second column shows the part of the wage differential due to the endowment component,
while the third column shows the share attributable to the remuneration component. It
is important to note that a positive sign of these values must be interpreted as a positive
contribution to the wage differential in favor of Zurich, whilst a negative sign indicates a
contribution in disfavor of Zurich.
The total decomposition of the wage differentials (i.e. the last row) appears rather
balanced between the two components in all the regions except for the Lake of Geneva
Region where the endowment component explains 70% of the existing gap. Therefore,
in the weak economic regions the total decomposition is similar to the one in the strong
North Western economy.
In order to understand the details of the decomposition it is necessary to comment
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the role played by the difference between the constant terms, i.e. the part of the wage
differential not explained by the variables and included in the remuneration component.
The constant effect is always large and negative except for Central Switzerland where
a large positive value is found. This latter region represents a case in which our model
has less explanatory power than in the other regions. Excluding the constant, the sub
total row shows that the human capital, the economic structure and the socioeconomic
characteristics explain only half of the observed wage gap. In the other regions, the nega-
tive constant effect reduces the gap by 14% to 40% raising the remuneration component.
Therefore, the sub total row shows that the model explains more than 100% of the ob-
served wage differential, and the remuneration component shares from 70% to 90% of
the observed gap doubling the part attributed to the endowment component in the weak
regions and in North Western Switzerland. The details emphasize the relevant role played
by the human capital in explaining regional wage disparities, explaining between 70% and
105% of the observed wage gap and doubling the share attributed to the economic struc-
ture. The part of the gap generated by the human capital is exclusively attributed to the
remuneration component and not to differences in the human capital levels. On the other
hand, the economic structure explains between 35% and 60% of the wage differentials but
this time due to the endowment component. The economic structure of Zurich generates
an advantage because the labor force is more concentrated in high value added activities.
It is also important to note that the human capital does not play a relevant role in
explaining the wage gap in Lake of Geneva Region, where the returns on schooling are
slightly higher than in Zurich (see Table 1.3 in the appendix 1.7). Here, the gap relative
to Zurich is due to differences in the observed means of the economic structure and in the
remuneration of the socioeconomic characteristics.
Other important aspects of wage differentials relative to Zurich, can be observed by
a more detailed decomposition (see Table 1.4 in the Appendix B). In particular, gender
reduces the differential relative to Zurich in Central Switzerland, Eastern Switzerland and
North Western Switzerland, respectively by -11%, -10% and -6.6% of the total wage gap.
In these regions the attenuation effects are due to males while females tend to increase the
disparities with respect to Zurich. Differently, in the Lake of Geneva Region, both males
24 USI
Oscar Gonzalez 1.5. Conclusions
and females contribute to increase the disparity by 4.9%. Permits for foreigners enlarge
the bias with respect to Zurich in Lake of Geneva Region and in Ticino. However, while in
Ticino the gap is attributable to cross-border commuters in both the components, in the
Lake of Geneva Region, Swiss workers are at the origin of the differential due mainly to the
remuneration component. Elsewhere, Swiss and foreigners with a permanent work permit
lower the bias through the remuneration component. Another important source of regional
wage disequilibrium is the part time variable, it explains from 7% to 27% of the total wage
differential relative to Zurich due exclusively to differences in the remuneration component.
The hierarchical level acts through the remuneration component and is relevant in the
Lake of Geneva Region where it explains 11% of the total bias. In Central Switzerland
and in Espace Mitteland we found the opposite result, the hierarchical level’s total effects
reduce the differentials respectively by -13% and -6%. Finally, contract type and firm
size are both only important in isolated cases, while the task required by firms has a
high and positive effect everywhere in the endowment component but a negative one the
remuneration component. As a result, the total impact on the wage gap is positive and
relevant in Lake of Geneva, Ticino and Eastern Switzerland while in the other regions the
two components balance.
1.5 Conclusions
In this paper, the wage differentials among different Swiss regions have been decomposed
into a differential due to individual endowments and to a different remuneration of the
characteristics (market). This has been done applying the “averaging coefficient” approach
developed by Yun (2005) in an extension to the Blinder–Oaxaca methodology to solve
the identification problem for detailed decomposition of wage differentials.
The results show that with respect to the richest Swiss region, Zurich, the average
wage differentials appear rather balanced among both components except for the Lake
of Geneva Region where the endowment component largely prevails. Among the fac-
tors that cause such wage differentials individual characteristics play an important role in
the remuneration component, while the job and firm characteristics mainly influence the
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endowment component. In particular, human capital variables are the most important
causes of the bias, not because Swiss regions show differences in the human capital levels
but in its remuneration. This seems to indicate a limited geographical mobility of the
labor force due to the characteristics of Switzerland explained above. In contrast, endow-
ment depends mainly on economic structure and type of occupation. Especially stronger
economic regions can compensate disadvantages from endowment through remuneration
of human capital attracting mobile foreign labor force. The remaining characteristics do
not play an important role in explaining the wage differentials except for isolated cases.
Therefore, the Yun methodology has the advantage to measure not only a detailed
decomposition but also to reorganize the results in a more suitable way. The aggregation of
the variables in categories as human capital, socioeconomic characteristics and job and firm
characteristics is useful in the interpretation of the results. This appears specially relevant
when analyzing wage differentials among regions rather than by ethnicity or gender where
the focus is in the measurement of the total discriminatory component.
In this paper no explanation on the causal relation between human capital, socioe-
conomic characteristics and economic structure has been provided, leaving this relevant
question for further research.
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1.6 Tables
Table 1.1: Means and standard deviation of selected variables
ZH NWS LGR CS ES EM TI
Ln wage 8.76 8.68 8.67 8.64 8.59 8.58 8.47
(0.42) (0.38) (0.43) (0.37) (0.35) (0.34) (0.4)
Lnw differential - 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.29
Human Capital:
- Schooling (years) 12.23 12.01 12.11 11.86 11.67 11.77 11.63
(2.16) (2.13) (2.31) (2.03) (2.04) (2.04) (2.24)
- Experience (years) 21.76 22.97 22.35 21.83 22.84 22.8 22.74
(11.56) (11.43) (11.24) (11.49) (11.7) (11.66) (11.25)
- Tenure (years) 8.11 9.53 8.76 8.95 9.42 9.29 9.05
(8.33) (9.34) (8.65) (8.94) (9.10) (8.99) (8.49)
Economic structure:
- Manufacturing* 0.18 0.27 0.16 0.32 0.39 0.33 0.26
- Chemical 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
- Financial intermediation 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06
- Computer & other 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.09
- High skill tasks 0.33 0.29 0.23 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.20
- Repetitive tasks 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.33
- Firm size +500 0.30 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.08
Socioeconomic chars:
- Female 0.36 0.32 0.39 0.31 0.30 0.36 0.36
- Non unionized 0.72 0.67 0.58 0.64 0.63 0.59 0.47
- Swiss 0.75 0.63 0.59 0.79 0.68 0.77 0.43
- Cross-border 0.01 0.14 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.30
Observations 167’234 115’677 125’023 65’631 96’967 186’416 28’191
Note: For the log natural wage, years of schooling, experience and tenure are reported the mean
and standard deviation, while for the other categorical variables are reported the shares.
*Manufacturing activities without the chemical sector. A detailed table with mean of all the
variables included in the model is available from the authors by request.
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Table 1.2: Decomposition of the wage differentials
North Western S. Lake of Geneva R. Central Switzerland
Characteristics Total EC RC Total EC RC Total EC RC
Human Capital 105.1 -5.2 110.3 3.8 -4.2 8.0 10.0 8.4 1.5
(8.6) (-0.4) (9.0) (0.4) (-0.4) (0.8) (1.3) (1.1) (0.2)
Ec. Structure 47.3 54.4 -7.2 60.0 66.7 -6.8 40.4 46.4 -5.9
(3.9) (4.5) (-0.6) (5.7) (6.3) (-0.6) (5.1) (5.8) (-0.7)
Socioeconomic -13.1 -1.4 -11.8 50.2 7.5 42.7 1.0 -6.6 7.6
(-1.1) (-0.1) (-1.0) (4.8) (0.7) (4.1) (0.1) (-0.8) (1.0)
Sub Total 139.3 47.8 91.3 114.0 70.0 43.9 51.4 48.2 3.2
(11.4) (3.9) (7.5) (10.8) (6.7) (4.2) (6.4) (6.0) (0.4)
Constant -39.3 -39.3 -14.0 -14.0 48.6 48.6
(-3.2) (-3.2) (-1.3) (-1.3) (6.1) (6.1)
Total 100.0 47.9 52.1 100.0 70.0 30.0 100.0 48.3 51.8
(8.2) (3.9) (4.3) (9.5) (6.7) (2.9) (12.5) (6.0) (6.5)
Eastern Switzerland Espace Mitteland Ticino
Characteristics Total EC RC Total EC RC Total EC RC
Human Capital 92.9 6.8 86.1 86.6 4.5 82.1 68.2 3.7 64.6
(15.9) (1.2) (14.7) (15.6) (0.8) (14.8) (19.6) (1.1) (18.5)
Ec. Structure 47.4 45.2 2.2 41.4 49.2 -7.8 35.3 38.0 -2.7
(8.1) (7.7) (0.4) (7.5) (8.9) (-1.4) (10.1) (10.9) (-0.8)
Socioeconomic -4.7 -4.1 -0.3 -3.5 0.3 -3.7 22.8 3.0 19.9
(-0.8) (-0.7) (-0.1) (-0.6) (0.1) (-0.7) (6.5) (0.9) (5.7)
SubTotal 135.6 47.9 88.0 124.5 54.0 70.6 126.3 44.7 81.8
(23.2) (8.2) (15.0) (22.4) (9.7) (12.7) (36.2) (12.8) (23.5)
Constant -35.6 -35.6 -24.5 -24.5 -26.4 -26.4
(-6.1) (-6.1) (-4.4) (-4.4) (-7.6) (-7.6)
Total 100.0 47.8 52.2 100.0 53.9 46.1 100.0 44.6 55.4
(17.1) (8.2) (8.9) (18.0) (9.7) (8.3) (28.7) (12.8) (15.9)
Note: Reference region Zurich. EC: endowment component; RC: remuneration component. The value in parenthesis
shows the contribution to the total wage differential in percentage points.
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1.7 Appendix
Appendix A
Table 1.3: Estimation results of the normalized regression equations
ZH NWS LGR CS ES EM TI
Constant 7.997 8.03 8.011 7.936 8.058 8.041 8.073
(1196.48)** (1099.52)** (1066.37)** (722.70)** (1062.46)** (1488.23)** (500.99)**
Schooling 0.037 0.033 0.04 0.039 0.031 0.031 0.028
(99.16)** (76.64)** (94.47)** (62.05)** (66.65)** (94.24)** (31.14)**
Experience 0.024 0.02 0.018 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.017
(100.83)** (77.88)** (63.18)** (59.68)** (63.58)** (88.92)** (29.71)**
Exp.2/100 -0.038 -0.032 -0.027 -0.034 -0.028 -0.027 -0.027
(80.90)** (62.76)** (47.43)** (47.65)** (52.42)** (72.85)** (24.06)**
Tenure 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003
(12.63)** (10.80)** (16.44)** (6.20)** (13.70)** (22.91)** (5.18)**
Ten.2/100 -0.002 -0.00028 -0.0046 -0.00007 -0.0018 -0.0043 0.00065
(2.39)* (0.44) (5.79)** (0.08) (2.63)** (8.48)** (0.41)
Male 0.065 0.069 0.063 0.084 0.091 0.074 0.087
(83.41)** (78.18)** (67.47)** (65.53)** (94.12)** (110.60)** (45.83)**
Female -0.065 -0.069 -0.063 -0.084 -0.091 -0.074 -0.087
(83.41)** (78.18)** (67.47)** (65.53)** (94.12)** (110.60)** (45.83)**
Swiss 0.016 0.045 -0.009 0.016 0.04 0.034 0.013
(7.76)** (22.55)** (4.80)** (3.90)** (20.95)** (21.27)** (2.62)**
Seasonal -0.018 -0.062 -0.052 -0.021 -0.045 -0.037 -0.032
(3.22)** (8.42)** (11.68)** (2.76)** (11.59)** (8.65)** (3.52)**
Annual 0.042 0.043 0.041 0.044 0.007 0.013 0.03
(14.54)** (14.19)** (13.89)** (8.69)** (2.53)* (5.05)** (3.82)**
Resident 0.005 0.034 0.006 0.018 0.025 0.025 -0.005
(2.33)* (15.18)** (3.04)** (4.08)** (11.65)** (14.01)** (0.96)
Commuter -0.015 0.015 0.024 -0.016 0.012 -0.013 -0.048
(3.26)** (6.34)** (9.82)** (0.91) (3.98)** (4.70)** (9.18)**
Other permit -0.029 -0.074 -0.01 -0.043 -0.039 -0.023 0.042
(5.44)** (17.25)** (1.80) (5.21)** (6.01)** (4.38)** (2.03)*
Other chars Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.6556 0.682 0.6668 0.6289 0.6451 0.6272 0.6608
Observations 167234 115677 125023 65631 95967 186416 28191
Note: We also controlled for marital status, part time, contract type, task required by firms, hierarchical levels, firm size, sectors and
occupations. A detailed table is available from the authors by request. Absolute t-statistics values are in parenthesis; * significant at
5%, ** significant at 1%.
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Appendix B
Table 1.4: Details of the decomposition of the wage differential in percentage
NWS LGR CS
Total EC RC Total EC RC Total EC RC
Total 100.0 47.9 52.1 100.0 70.0 30.0 100.0 48.3 51.8
Constant -39.3 0.0 -39.3 -14.0 0.0 -14.0 48.6 0.0 48.6
Human Capital 105.1 -5.2 110.3 3.8 -4.2 8.0 10.0 8.4 1.5
Schooling 67.6 10.2 57.3 -38.8 4.9 -43.7 -13.3 11.0 -24.2
Experience 39.5 -11.3 50.8 52.8 -7.3 60.1 20.5 -0.9 21.4
Tenure -2.0 -4.2 2.1 -10.2 -1.7 -8.4 2.7 -1.6 4.4
Ec. Structure 47.3 54.4 -7.2 60.0 66.7 -6.8 40.4 46.4 -5.9
Hierarchical Level -3.1 7.1 -10.2 11.2 0.8 10.4 -12.7 -1.7 -10.9
Occupations 29.6 22.5 7.0 18.1 15.9 2.2 30.5 16.2 14.3
Contract Type 7.4 1.9 5.5 -5.1 2.0 -7.2 -1.6 0.9 -2.5
Task Required -1.0 13.3 -14.3 19.1 28.5 -9.4 1.2 10.0 -8.8
Firm Size -3.1 -1.1 -2.0 6.6 4.9 1.7 11.2 4.4 6.8
Sectors 17.5 10.7 6.8 10.1 14.6 -4.5 11.8 16.6 -4.8
Socioeconomic chars -13.1 -1.4 -11.8 50.2 7.5 42.7 1.0 -6.6 7.6
Gender -6.6 -5.0 -1.6 4.9 4.4 0.5 -11.0 -5.3 -5.8
Marital Status 1.0 -1.4 2.3 2.3 -1.3 3.6 3.0 -0.4 3.4
Permit -26.7 5.1 -31.8 15.2 3.8 11.4 -2.5 -0.5 -1.9
Part Time 19.2 -0.1 19.3 27.8 0.6 27.2 11.5 -0.4 11.9
ES EM TI
Total EC RC Total EC RC Total EC RC
Total 100.0 47.8 52.2 100.0 53.9 46.1 100.0 44.6 55.4
Constant -35.6 0.0 -35.6 -24.5 0.0 -24.5 -26.4 0.0 -26.4
Human Capital 92.9 6.8 86.1 86.6 4.5 82.1 68.2 3.7 64.6
Schooling 51.7 12.3 39.4 47.6 9.6 38.0 44.9 7.8 37.1
Experience 45.4 -3.6 49 43.6 -3.5 47.1 24.5 -3.3 27.8
Tenure -4.1 -1.9 -2.2 -4.6 -1.6 -3.0 -1.2 -0.9 -0.4
Ec. Structure 47.4 45.2 2.2 41.4 49.2 -7.8 35.3 38.0 -2.7
Hierarchical Level -6.0 2.0 -8.0 -0.6 3.6 -4.2 1.3 0.3 0.9
Occupations 22.6 17.6 5.0 18.0 17.0 1.0 12.4 10.8 1.7
Contract Type 5.8 0.2 5.6 2.7 1.2 1.6 -2.0 2.4 -4.4
Task Required 5.7 10.2 -4.6 3.9 14.0 -10.1 8.0 12.9 -4.9
Firm Size 3.2 2.1 1.1 0.2 1.9 -1.7 6.6 4.1 2.5
Sectors 16.1 13.1 3.1 17.2 11.5 5.6 9.0 7.5 1.5
Socioeconomic chars -4.7 -4.1 -0.3 -3.5 0.3 -3.7 22.8 3.0 19.9
Gender -10.3 -4.2 -6.0 -1.4 0.1 -1.4 -1.9 0.2 -2.1
Marital Status 1.7 -0.7 2.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.1 -1.2 -0.5 -0.7
Permit -10.1 1.0 -11.0 -8.7 0.3 -9.0 8.0 3.4 4.7
Part Time 14.0 -0.2 14.3 6.9 0.3 6.6 17.9 -0.1 18.0
Note: Reference region Zurich. EC: endowment component; RC: remuneration component.
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Abstract
Wage differentials among natives and foreigners are analyzed for a trans–border labor
market segmented by task. Two methodologies have been used to decompose the gap
into endowment and unexplained component: the traditional parametric Blinder–Oaxaca
approach and a nonparametric propensity score matching technique. The results are quite
robust regarding the methodology used. In general, from 15% to 30% of the gap remains
unexplained in both the high and low task segments with two exceptions: cross–borders in
the low task segment (40%) and foreigners with annual permits in the high task segment
(60%).
JEL–Classification: C13, C14, J31, J61, J71
Keywords: Wage decomposition, propensity score matching, foreign workers.
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2.1 Introduction
Switzerland historically has a high share of immigrant workers. In 2002, foreigners ac-
counted for a quarter of the Swiss manpower. As a consequence, several authors have
studied the immigration problem from different perspectives as in Bu¨rgenmeier et al.
(1992), Flu¨ckiger (1998), Golder and Straubhaar (1999), Flu¨ckiger and Nejadan (2000),
de Coulon et al. (2001) and Mu¨ller (2003a,b). The special interest in the Swiss case
arises from its geographical position, its small scale, and its federalist structure. Situated
in the center of Europe without being member of the EU implies that wages can be greatly
influenced by neighboring labor markets which are of different relevance for the various
regions. Swiss border Cantons historically show higher shares of foreign workers due to
the possibility to hire cross–border commuters. Therefore wage differentials between na-
tives and immigrants represent an important topic in Switzerland especially for border
Cantons. Nevertheless, low attention has been given to the analysis of the problematic on
a regional scale, with the exception of Flu¨ckiger and Nejadan (2000) who compare the
cases of the Cantons Geneva, Basel and Ticino.
This article analyses wage differentials among natives and foreigners in the Swiss Can-
ton of Ticino, a small labor market with 160000 workers (4% of Switzerland) and situated
on the Italian border. Foreign workers in Ticino are 41% of total employment and half
of them are foreign cross-border commuters coming from the North Italian Provinces1
attracted by existing wage differentials. This renewed political attention and provoked,
among else, an interest in measuring and explaining wage differentials between domestic
and foreign labor force.
The high presence of foreign labor force produced differentiated protectionist regula-
tion, which in the case of Switzerland (and Ticino) has taken the form of various contin-
gents distinguished by different kinds of permits. The attribution of these permits followed
a logic of restricting local firms’ access to foreign labor force to specific skills not avail-
able among the local population2. There are four categories of foreigners distinguished
1The employment basin of the neighboring Italian Provinces counts around 1 million workers
that can potentially apply for a cross–border commuter working permit.
2Firms seeking labor in one of these segments were forced by regulation to source first among
local work force and only afterwards on the market for permits. As a consequence, the analysis
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by this regulation. These categories are: cross–border commuters (implicit contingent via
the definition of a corridor beyond the Swiss border), foreigners with an annual permit
(contingent), resident immigrants (implicit contingent via the procedure of access to res-
idence after a transition period with annual permits) and seasonal permit (contingent)3.
One result of this regulation is a strong differentiation by skills of the foreign work force
present in these four categories.
The objective of this paper is to decompose the wage differential between natives and
foreigners in these permit groups in the Canton Ticino considering a segmentation of the
labor market by task required by firms into a deterministic component (endowment) and
unexplained component (due to unobservable differences).
Two streams of literature are relevant in this context. A first one follows the pio-
neering study by Piore (1973) and successively developed by Bulow and Summers (1986)
interpreting differences in wages for different groups as a consequence of labor market
segmentation. The second is based on Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) and decompose
wage differences by gender or ethnicity into a deterministic component (endowment) and
an unexplained component (discrimination). In a more recent literature, nonparametric
approaches have been used to investigate wage differential decomposition. In particu-
lar, the applicability of the propensity score matching approach developed by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) to a large variety of fields including a nonparametric wage differential
decomposition into a deterministic and an unexplained component.
Two sources of selection bias make the comparison of the wages between native and
foreign workers difficult. The first is related to the selection based on observables: different
characteristics (common support problem) and different distribution of these characteris-
tics (weighting across the common support), while the second comes from the selection
based on unobservables: differences across the different groups like unobserved abilities,
incentives to migrate, discrimination and others. There is a large literature that has been
focusing on selection when considering the wage gap between natives and immigrants, the
of wage formation has to follow a segmentation by skills and a discrimination between locals and
foreigners.
3This category has not been considered in the empirical analysis due to the small number of
observations available.
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main contribution stemming from Borjas (1994) who explains immigrants self selection
and the decision to migrate based on relative advantages. Moreover, selection can arise
due to immigration policies of the host country. The unobserved bias can be attributable
not only to incentives to migrate and to the local policies but also to integration problems,
skills, language, living costs and discrimination.
When separating the market by tasks required by firms it is implicitly assumed that
the market behaves differently relative to skill segments. The reasonable assumption
that high skill workers would likely be employed in the high task segment, allows the
comparison of the wage gap decomposition across segments and types of permit for workers
employed in similar tasks. The interest of such analysis lies in the nature of the permits.
Cross–border commuters are subject to a wage penalty because Swiss firms can take
advantages of arbitrage due to the different cost of living between Canton Ticino and
the neighboring Italian Provinces. Moreover they have never been limited in number but
subject to geographical restrictions. Cross–border commuters systematically earn lower
wages than Swiss, but it is interesting to understand the nature of the differential across
segments. Immigrants, and in particular foreigners with an annual permit allow for another
important comparison. This category is subject to a contingent by the Swiss immigration
authority and is allowed to live and work in Switzerland for one year, with the possibility
of a renewal of the contract. Another interesting comparison is the one between Swiss and
foreign workers with permanent residence, the best integrated group of immigrants.
In this paper two methodologies have been adopted in order to decompose the wage
differential between Swiss and the four segments of foreigners. The first is the usual
Blinder–Oaxaca parametric approach, and the second a nonparametric technique using a
propensity score matching. Comparing the Blinder–Oaxaca method with the more flexible
and reliable nonparametric approaches permits to achieve more robust results.
In what follows the models of wage decompositions are presented using the parametric
Blinder–Oaxaca approach and the non parametric propensity score matching methodology.
Then, the data used for the analysis and description of the sample characteristics are
presented. Finally, the empirical findings are discussed and some conclusions drawn.
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2.2 Methodology
Define an indicator variable D ∈ {s, f1, f2, f3} where s = Swiss (the benchmark group),
f1 = permanents, f2 = annuals and f3 = cross–border commuters. The potential log
wages for worker i are set as wsi and wji, where wsi is the wage that individual i would
receive if treated as a Swiss worker while wji when treated as one of the foreign permit
group fj , j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Each individual can observe only one of the potential outcomes,
while the remaining non observed wages are the counterfactuals, i.e. the expected wage
a worker would earn if in possess of a different permit to work, and assume that there is
a positive probability to be a Swiss (D = s) or to be a foreign (D = fj) given a set of
observed covariates X
0 < Pr(D = d|X) < 1 (2.1)
Given this setting, the expected wage for a Swiss worker employed in a determined task
segment T ∈ {Low, High} is E(w|T,D = s), while E(w|T,D = fj) the respective expected
wage for a foreigner in group j and task T .
The wage differential between foreigners and Swiss for each segment of task T , taking
the natives’ wages as reference4, can be decomposed as follows:
E(w|T,D = fj)− E(w|T,D = s) =
= {E(wj |T,D = fj)− E(ws|T,D = fj)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexplained component
+ {E(ws|T,D = fj)− E(ws|T,D = s)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained component
(2.2)
where the first term indicates the part of the wage differential due to differences in unob-
servable characteristics5 (i.e. the unexplained component) while the second measures the
endowment effect on the differential (i.e. the explained component). This decomposition
follows in a more general setting the one used in Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).
The conditional wage expectations E(w|T,D = fj) and E(w|T,D = s) are identified
from data and can be estimated by subsample means. In this decomposition, the problem
4As a consequence, three wage differentials for each segment T have been considered.
5In a treatment evaluation literature context this term is called the average treatment effect on
the treated.
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is how to identify the counterfactual wage
E(ws|T,D = fj) (2.3)
the potential wage earned by foreigners if evaluated as a Swiss worker, that is not iden-
tified from data. To avoid this problem, in treatment evaluation literature is common
use to assume conditional independence, i.e. that conditional on a set of observable vari-
ables X, the probability of treatment receipt is stochastically independent of the potential
outcomes6. To our purpose, it is sufficient the weaker assumption of conditional mean
independence
E(ws|X,T,D = fj) = E(ws|X,T,D = s) = E(ws|X,T ) (2.4)
Therefore, under assumption (2.4), the counterfactual can be identified as
E(ws|T,D = fj) = E[E(ws|X,T,D = fj)|T,D = fj ]
= E[E(ws|X,T,D = s)|T,D = fj ] (2.5)
where the first equality in (2.5) follows from the law of iterated expectations while the last
equality follows from assumption (2.4) of conditional mean independence.
The expected wage differential between foreigners and Swiss can be rewritten as:
E(w|T,D = fj)− E(w|T,D = s) =
{E[E(wj |X,T,D = fj)|T,D = fj ]− E[E(ws|X,T,D = s)|T,D = fj ]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexplained component
+
+ {E[E(ws|X,T,D = s)|T,D = fj ]− E[E(ws|X,T,D = s)|T,D = s]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained component
(2.6)
and now the conditional mean expectations are all identified.
In this paper two specifications have been adopted to estimate the conditional mean
6This condition is called selection on observables by Barnow et al. (1981), ignorable treatment
assignment by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) or conditional independence assumption by Lechner
(1999).
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expectations E(w|X,T,D = s) and E(w|X,T,D = fj) in order to decompose the wage
differential. The first is the usual Blinder–Oaxaca parametric specification, and the second
a nonparametric specification using a propensity score matching7 following the approach
developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in treatment evaluations.
The advantages in using two methodologies lies not only in the possibility to improve
the robustness of the results, but also to take account of the more recent literature that
has criticized the traditional Blinder–Oaxaca method in favor of more flexible and reliable
nonparametric approaches.
2.2.1 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
The traditional Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) parametric decomposition assumes
linearity of the conditional mean expectations:
E(wj |X,T,D = fj) = β′jtX if T = t (2.7)
E(ws|X,T,D = s) = β′stX if T = t (2.8)
where βjt and βst are the vectors of parameters. Under assumption (2.4) of conditional
mean independence, and equation (2.5), the counterfactual can be defined as
E(ws|T,D = fj) = β′stE(X|T,D = fj) (2.9)
where E(X|T = t,D = fj) is estimable by subsample means, while βdt are the vector
parameters to be estimated in the regression equations by OLS for each T andD subsample
wjt = β′jtX + jt if D = fj and T = t (2.10)
wst = β′stX + st if D = s and T = t (2.11)
where  is the error term with the usual form. The Blinder-Oaxaca methodology estimates
separately a wage equation (2.10) and (2.11) for each considered subpopulation, allowing
different values of the parameters but with the same structural model, i.e. it allows the
7For a review of the matching literature see Imbens (2004).
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labor market to evaluate the same observed characteristics differently: βst 6= βjt.
Segmenting the market on tasks (T ) required by firm it is implicitly assumed that the
market evaluates individual characteristics differently across tasks. The idea behind this
approach is that firms are looking for skills on the labor market that are not observable.
What firms know is the task required for each job offered. Therefore, firms select workers
or workers self–select the respective task based on a set of information that is not always
common knowledge. Foreigners usually occupy different jobs than natives8 due to specific
individual abilities or due to immigration policies that select foreigners in determined
segments of the market in order to protect natives. Therefore it is reasonable to expect
different shares in the decomposition of the wage gap relative to each segment for the same
permit group, and comparing the wage differential decomposition between Swiss and each
permit group across the segments will be useful.
Under these assumptions, the wage differential decomposition can be represented as
wjt − wst = (βˆjt − βˆst)′Xjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexplained component
+ βˆ′st(Xjt −Xst)︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained component
if T = t (2.12)
where wjt, wst represent the wage subsample means of the considered groups. The first
term on the right hand side in equation (2.12) is the component due to unexplained
factors and in the Blinder–Oaxaca tradition this is attributed to different remuneration
of the market9 the second one due to different endowments (or due to differences in the
observed characteristics).
The traditional Blinder-Oaxaca parametric decomposition relies on the need of impos-
ing a functional form of the wage structure. Due to its properties, the regression approach
ignores the common support assumption, leading the regression to predict the counter-
factual outside the common support thus referring to who do not exist which produces
misleading results.
8A recent work of Ottaviano and Peri (2006) analyses in a general framework the substitutabil-
ity between foreign and native labor force for the US case. They argue that specific abilities of the
foreign workers are an important issue in explaining the differences observed in occupations.
9In a comparison by ethnic groups or by gender this component is usually called the discrimi-
natory part of the wage differential.
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2.2.2 Propensity Score Matching Methodology
Non parametric approaches, like e.g. matching estimators, do not need any assumption
of linearity of the conditional mean expectations, and restrict the comparison of wages in
the common support. Recent literature on wage decomposition as Nopo (2004), Djurd-
jevic and Radyakin (2005) and Jurajda and Paligorova (2006) suggests that employing
the regression–based techniques and thus ignoring this comparability issue, often referred
as the “common support” problem, can lead to misleading results. As an alternative
they consider nonparametric approaches as advocated in the recent program evaluation
literature (see, e.g. Heckman et al. (1998)).
The application of nonparametric techniques, e.g. exact matching, can be difficult
to implement when the set of conditioning variables X is large. If X are discrete, small
cell problems may arise. If X are continuous and the conditional mean expectations
E(w|X,T,D = s) and E(w|X,T,D = fj) are estimated nonparametrically, then conver-
gence rates will be slow due to the so–called “curse of dimensionality” problem. Fortu-
nately, alternative approaches as the propensity score matching technique proposed by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) can be used to reduce the dimensionality of the matching
estimator. In a line of this literature, Jurajda and Paligorova (2006) show the validity of
the instrument when a population is composed by two sub–groups, while Imbens (2000)
and Lechner (2001) extend the propensity score matching technique from a binary to a
multiple treatment evaluation program.
As shown by Heckman et al. (1998) in an extension of the Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983), under assumption (2.4) of conditional mean independence and assumption (2.1)
of positive conditional probability of treatment exposure the expected mean of ws is also
mean independent of D conditional on the propensity score P j|sj(X), namely:
E[ws|P j|sj(X), T,D = fj ] = E[ws|P j|sj(X), T,D = s] = E[ws|P j|sj(X), T ] (2.13)
where P j|sj(X) = Pr(D = fj |X,T,D = fj or D = s) is the conditional propensity score,
an index used for the matching and therefore to construct the counterfactual that can be
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estimated by probit (or logit) as
P j|sj(X) =
Pˆ j(X)
Pˆ j(X) + Pˆ s(X)
(2.14)
where Pˆ j(X) is the predicted probability to be a foreigner with permit fj instead of being
a Swiss, conditional on the vector of characteristics X. In this situation as underlined
by Lechner (2002) the conditional probabilities are required since the comparisons to be
made consider only two different groups of the overall population. Separate binary choice
equations are estimated for each of the possible six pairs of groups in order to obtain P j|sj .
Therefore, only observations that are either on subsample s or one of the fj ’s are included
in the calculation of the conditional probability10.
The estimation of the unexplained component of the wage differential can be conse-
quently written as:
E[w|T,D = fj ]− E[E(ws|P j|sj(X), T,D = s)|T,D = fj ] (2.15)
where the first term is the expected wage for a foreign worker in segment T , while the
second term is the counterfactual estimate of equation (2.3) for foreign worker, i.e. the
wage she would earn if treated as Swiss worker in a given segment T and conditional on
a propensity score.
After the propensity score estimation, the common support requirement must be ac-
complished. In the multiple–treatment (e.g. Lechner (2002)) the common support is
determined by the minima of the maximum and the maxima of the minima participation
probabilities for the various treatment options. In the application, kernel11 matching with
replacement has been performed (Heckman et al. (1997, 1998)).
It follows that the advantage of the nonparametric approach are related to the absence
of a specific functional form, the non linearity of the propensity score (precision of the
probit) and the comparison inside the common support. Subsequently enlarging the di-
10Lechner (2002) shows two different ways of calculating the propensity score but advocates the
easier reduce form approach based on the binary choice model as alternative to be preferred to
multivariate discrete choice technique.
11Kernel matching is based on the estimated propensity scores and takes local averages of the
untreated observations near each treated observations.
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mensionality of the confounding characteristics vector X it is possible to separate the wage
differential attributable to a sub–set of the characteristics X for the explained component
(i.e. human capital, sectors, etc ...) for both the methodologies.
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
The data used for the empirical analysis stem from the Swiss Wage Structure Survey12
(SWSS) 2004 that provides cross–section data containing information of worker employed
in Ticino. The data is collected by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) among a
representative sample of firms providing individual information on gross nominal monthly
standardized wages13, age, years of tenure in the current firm, levels of education achieve-
ment, gender, marital status, type of contracts, percentage of part–time work, hierarchical
level, firm size, 13 sectors (according to the NOGA 2002 classification) and 24 occupa-
tions (according to the classification proposed by the SFSO in the survey). The survey also
provides specific information on foreigners (by categories of permits: Swiss, permanent,
annual, cross–border, other short term14) and on tasks required by firms described as the
level of task required by the firm for a specific job occupied by a worker (independently of
the skill level of the worker actually employed). Two levels of tasks are distinguished and
used to segment our samples according to the presence of supervisory tasks (high tasks)
and the requirement of special competences (low tasks)15.
33′604 observations are feasible for our analysis and Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show
mean and standard deviation for a selected set of variables.
Relative to the high task segment (Table 2.1) it can be observed that annuals are
the group that shows the highest level of wages followed by Swiss, permanents and cross–
border commuters. Annuals are on average younger with less years of tenure (probably due
12In German the survey is called “Schweizerische Lohnstrukturerhebung (LSE)”.
13The SFSO provides individual October’s 2004 gross wages in Swiss Francs standardized to 4
and 1/3 weeks at 40 hours day and including 1/12 of an annual bonus where applicable.
14In the category of “other short term permits” we can distinguish seasonal workers from for-
eigners with a year of permit to less than a year. We excluded those categories from our analysis
due to the limited number of available observations.
15The dataset originally contains four categories of tasks required by firms. In order to have
enough observations for the analysis two categories have been constructed from the original four.
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to the nature of the temporary permit) and more educated than any other group. Perma-
nent immigrants and cross–border commuters present a more balanced distribution across
education achievements than Swiss with higher concentration in the compulsory level. The
apprenticeship plays an important role in the Swiss educational system, therefore it is no
surprise that 41% of natives possess this degree.
Concerning gender, it may affect the wage distribution due to discrimination. More
specifically, foreign workers are less likely to be females than Swiss and this could be
related to the migration mechanism.
The human capital composition by groups seems to drive the distribution of hierarchi-
cal levels and sectors confirming the decisive role of the wage structure. Swiss, annuals and
permanents show similar hierarchical distributions where roughly half of the sub–sample
are employed in a top management position, while cross–borders are more likely to be
employed in a blue collar position relative to the other groups.
The allocation by sector reveals once more the similarities between Swiss, annuals and
permanents, and the fact that cross–borders are more concentrated in low skill activities
like manufacturing and construction.
Table 2.2 shows selected descriptive statistics for the low task segment. Here the
ranking on wages is different if compared to Table 2.1. Swiss workers earn most followed
by permanents, annuals and cross–borders. Again, annuals are younger and with low
levels of tenure, confirming the dependence on the permit characteristic.
The distribution of education achievements confirms again the importance of the ap-
prenticeship in the Swiss educational system. 58% of natives possess and apprenticeship
while foreigners are more likely to have achieved a compulsory degree.
The share of woman in the low task segment is higher compared to Table 2.1, suggesting
that females are less likely to occupy high task jobs than males, and Swiss show a higher
share of females compared to foreigners like in the high task segment.
The distribution by hierarchical levels shows that Swiss are more likely to be em-
ployed as low manager than foreigners which account for 80% of the workers in blue collar
positions.
Considering the allocation by sectors, Swiss are more concentrated in the high skill
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activities (financial intermediation and real estate, renting and related activities) than
foreigners. The distribution across foreigner groups is very similar, the only relevant
differences are represented by the concentration of cross–border commuters in the man-
ufacturing sector and the higher share of annuals in the hotel and restaurant activities
(sector characterized by seasonal employment).
This short data description highlights some aspect of the Ticino labor market. First,
Swiss workers do not earn systematically more than foreigners. In the high task segment,
annuals earn more than any other group suggesting that wage differentials between Swiss
and foreigners are not only driven by discrimination but can be the result of selection pro-
cesses. Second, cross–border commuters are always the lowest paid category in both task
segments. Therefore, the arbitrage between Ticino and Northern Italy due to differences
in the cost of living seems to play an important role in accentuating the wage differentials
that could be reflected in a higher unexplained component. Finally, the human capital
variables seem to be important in explaining the wage level and the dependence on the al-
location by hierarchical levels as well as by sectors. However, omitting the information on
the other observables (sectors, hierarchical levels, etc...) would lead to an overestimation
of the unexplained component of the wage differential.
For this reason, the wage differentials have been first decomposed considering only
human capital covariates and successively adding other observed characteristics that may
influence the wage structure.
2.4 Empirical results
Table 2.3 shows the results of the parametric Blinder–Oaxaca and the nonparametric
propensity score matching decomposition of the wage differential between Swiss workers
and each group of foreigners taking natives as benchmark group. As previously mentioned
for Swiss workers and each permit group two decompositions relative to the task segment
have been performed.
The first row of each methodology reports the average wage differential in logarithms
and then the corresponding conditional gaps based on different regression specifications
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reporting the unobserved component and the relative share. The first specification includes
human capital variables, i.e. age and age square, tenure and tenure square, education levels
and gender. The second specification includes the whole set of observed covariates16.
The observed wage differentials slightly differ among the two methodologies because
the nonparametric decomposition is restricted to the common support condition17. In
fact, the sub–sample observations are less for the nonparametric approach than for the
classic Blinder–Oaxaca. However, in each Swiss-foreign comparison there are only few
observation out of the support, i.e. the estimated propensity scores are well overlapped,
the only exception is represented by permanents in the high task segment, where the
common support condition reduces the wage gap by 5% as compared to the common
support restriction.
Considering the results obtained from the Blinder–Oaxaca parametric approach with
the first specification, the human capital has more explanatory power in the low task
segment than in the high task segment. For annuals in the low task segment, 30% of
the gap remains unexplained when including human capital variables, while the respective
figures are 54% and 66% for permanents and cross–border commuters. In the high task
segment, the unexplained gap rises to 83% for cross–borders, 74% for annuals and reaches
138% for permanents showing that for the last permit group the human capital reduces
the observed wage gap by 38%.
When the model includes all variables, the unexplained component decreases for all
groups and in both the segments. In detail, for annual workers the unexplained component
is 58% of the observed positive wage gap in the high task segment and 13% in the low task
segment where the wage differential is negative. Permanent workers show a lower share of
the unexplained component in the high task segment (17%) than in the low task segment
(26%), while cross–border unexplained share is 26% in the high task segment and 43% in
the lower task segment.
Considering now the results of the wage decomposition from the nonparametric pro-
16Since most of the regressors are dummy variables, this specification is rather flexible. Including
additionally a large amount of interaction terms was not possible because many cells will have few
or zero observations.
17The nonparametric decompositions including human capital variables and including all the
covariates have been both restricted to the same common support.
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cedure, after estimating a probit equation model with the same structure used for the
Blinder–Oaxaca model 18, they appear slightly different even if the overall conclusion
remain the same.
When the probit model includes only human capital variables, the unexplained com-
ponent is lower than the parametric approach for cross–borders and permanents but not
for annuals. As in the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition, the human capital variables are
more relevant in explaining the wage differentials in low task segments. In this segment,
Swiss take profit from human capital differences especially in comparison to the annuals
where human capital explains 60% of the gap, while the human capital variables explain
50% of the gap relative to permanents and 44% if considering cross–border commuters.
For annuals and cross–borders in the high task segment, more than 80% of the gap re-
mains unexplained, while for permanents in the same segment, the human capital is not
informative to explain differences in the earnings.
When including the whole set of observed variables, once again the unexplained com-
ponent is reduced but now the estimated unexplained components are in general higher
than with the traditional Blinder–Oaxaca methodology. For annuals the unexplained part
of the wage gap is more than half of the observed differential in the high task segment,
while for permanents and cross–borders in the same task segment the unexplained com-
ponent is roughly one third of the gap. After considering the whole set of the observed
variables in the low task segment, for cross–borders 40% of the gap is attributable to the
unexplained component, while the figures are 35% for annuals and 26% for permanent
workers.
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper, wage differentials between locals, immigrant workers, and cross–border com-
muters have been decomposed in two components: endowment (selection on observables)
and unexplained component (selection on unobservables). Two methodologies have been
applied: the traditional Blinder–Oaxaca parametric decomposition and a more flexible
18The results obtained from the probit model are available from the author on request.
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non parametric propensity score matching technique. The two methodologies produce a
slightly different decomposition but the overall conclusions remain the same. The differ-
ences in the results may be only partially due to the common support restriction, only few
observations remain out of the common support evidencing that for almost every Swiss
there is a “similar” foreign worker in every permit group considered. Other sources of dif-
ferences in the results may be attributable to the parameter estimation and to the choice
of the probit model specification.
In general, the results show that human capital plays an important role in explaining
the wage differentials especially in the low task segment.
When including the whole set of variables, in general from 15% to one third is at-
tributable to the unexplained component in both the task segments except for two cases,
i.e. cross–borders in low task segment and annuals in high task segment, where 40% and
60% of the observed wage gap are attributable to the unexplained component respectively.
The Canton Ticino shows a scarcity of human resources on the local labor market
(not surprisingly given the high share of foreigners). Foreign workers show a different
distribution of characteristic depending on the permit to work. Annuals are much more
similar in the high task segment to Swiss workers than permanent and cross–borders than
are less skilled. In the low task segment, foreigners appear less skilled than Swiss workers.
Cross–border commuters are always the least paid group with highest unexplained
negative penalty suggesting that for high skill jobs, local firms could not find the required
skills in the neighboring region.
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2.6 Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of selected variables, high task segment
Swiss Annuals Permanents Cross-borders
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Ln Wage 8.87 0.501 9.07 0.538 8.85 0.500 8.67 0.363
Age 42.61 11.123 37.71 8.649 43.14 10.614 41.26 9.491
Tenure 9.76 9.524 3.29 3.721 9.32 8.296 8.23 8.794
College 0.27 0.446 0.61 0.489 0.24 0.426 0.23 0.421
High School 0.28 0.451 0.21 0.409 0.23 0.419 0.23 0.422
Apprenticeship 0.41 0.492 0.08 0.276 0.37 0.483 0.25 0.434
Compulsory 0.02 0.153 0.04 0.205 0.11 0.311 0.17 0.375
Other Schools 0.01 0.075 0.05 0.226 0.05 0.227 0.12 0.323
Female 0.35 0.477 0.29 0.456 0.25 0.434 0.28 0.450
Top Manager 0.51 0.500 0.55 0.498 0.47 0.499 0.30 0.457
Low Manager 0.29 0.452 0.24 0.426 0.31 0.464 0.39 0.488
Blue Collar 0.20 0.402 0.21 0.409 0.22 0.413 0.31 0.464
Manufacturing 0.24 0.430 0.19 0.395 0.25 0.435 0.38 0.486
Construction 0.04 0.198 0.02 0.154 0.06 0.246 0.10 0.304
Wholesale & retail 0.14 0.345 0.14 0.349 0.17 0.377 0.12 0.330
Hotels & Restaurants 0.02 0.133 0.03 0.169 0.05 0.217 0.02 0.131
Financial activities 0.15 0.353 0.22 0.414 0.12 0.323 0.02 0.145
Real estate & renting 0.14 0.351 0.10 0.294 0.10 0.302 0.08 0.276
Observations 6’027 410 1’251 1’720
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of selected variables, low task segment
Swiss Annuals Permanents Cross-borders
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Ln Wage 8.50 0.323 8.38 0.346 8.39 0.289 8.31 0.298
Age 39.76 11.577 34.90 8.307 41.89 10.827 40.34 10.135
Tenure 8.20 8.432 3.25 3.746 8.45 7.936 8.30 8.557
College 0.05 0.223 0.10 0.298 0.02 0.137 0.03 0.164
High School 0.15 0.357 0.10 0.307 0.07 0.255 0.07 0.262
Apprenticeship 0.58 0.493 0.19 0.394 0.31 0.464 0.19 0.391
Compulsory 0.20 0.401 0.51 0.500 0.54 0.499 0.61 0.487
Other Schools 0.01 0.121 0.09 0.288 0.06 0.242 0.09 0.293
Female 0.53 0.499 0.43 0.495 0.41 0.492 0.36 0.481
Top Manager 0.04 0.190 0.02 0.151 0.02 0.139 0.02 0.123
Low Manager 0.27 0.445 0.22 0.412 0.18 0.382 0.19 0.393
Blue Collar 0.69 0.462 0.76 0.427 0.80 0.397 0.79 0.405
Manufacturing 0.19 0.390 0.23 0.419 0.22 0.416 0.53 0.499
Construction 0.03 0.166 0.09 0.282 0.11 0.308 0.12 0.324
Wholesale & retail 0.19 0.395 0.17 0.377 0.20 0.404 0.11 0.315
Hotels & Restaurants 0.02 0.145 0.12 0.326 0.07 0.254 0.02 0.141
Financial activities 0.14 0.351 0.07 0.255 0.06 0.237 0.01 0.118
Real estate & renting 0.10 0.305 0.11 0.309 0.08 0.271 0.05 0.220
Observations 10’413 943 4’783 8’057
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Table 2.3: Results of the wage differential decomposition, uncexplained component
Blinder Oaxaca
Annuals Permanents Cross-borders
High Task Low Task High Task Low Task High Task Low Task
Wage differential 0.200 -0.128 -0.02 -0.117 -0.196 -0.199
Human capital
Unexplained part 0.148 -0.039 -0.028 -0.063 -0.164 -0.132
std error (0.024) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005)
Share 74% 30% 138% 54% 83% 66%
All variables
Unexplained part 0.116 -0.017 -0.003 -0.031 -0.05 -0.086
std error (0.023) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005)
Share 58% 13% 17% 26% 26% 43%
Nr. Foreigners 410 943 1251 4783 1720 8057
Nr. Swiss 6027 10413 6027 10413 6027 10413
Propensity score matching*
Annuals Permanents Cross-borders
High Task Low Task High Task Low Task High Task Low Task
Wage differential 0.201 -0.127 -0.015 -0.116 -0.193 -0.199
Human capital
Unexplained part 0.166 -0.052 -0.015 -0.059 -0.157 -0.132
std error (0.029) (0.013) (0.017) (0.006) (0.017) (0.007)
Share 83% 41% 100% 51% 81% 66%
All variables
Unexplained gap 0.133 -0.044 -0.005 -0.03 -0.063 -0.079
std error (0.030) (0.015) (0.017) (0.007) (0.020) (0.008)
Share 66% 35% 34% 26% 33% 40%
Nr. Foreigners 407 936 1240 4773 1715 8050
Nr. Swiss 5984 10354 5963 10413 5940 10413
Note: * Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 0.06. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of cross–border commuters on Swiss labor market in view
of its liberalization. This is a particular labor market with high levels of foreign workers
and a regulatory discontinuity across two inside regions. The possibility to distinguish
two areas where cross–border commuters can be employed or not is the key of this analy-
sis. Taking into account immigration endogeneity as well as the limited mobility of local
labor supply, comparing local workers wages across the regulatory discontinuity I found
evidence that cross–border commuters generate downward wage pressure on low skilled
workers. However, the penalties seem to be more accentuated for resident immigrants
than for Swiss workers due to differences observed in the skill composition.
JEL classification: F22, J24, J31, J61
Keywords: wages, immigrant workers, regulatory discontinuity, skills
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3.1 Introduction
The access of immigrant labor force to the Swiss labor market has historically been limited
by a system of quotas and by permits for foreigners that have been conceded only in absence
of equivalent local labor supply. Since 1st June 2002 the Swiss labor market is experiencing
a transition period where the Free Movement of Persons between Switzerland and the
European Union member states will be gradually introduced and fully implemented within
12 years1. This change removes the most important instrument that has been used by
Switzerland to control the immigration inflow. Currently the lack of sufficiently long
evidence gives rise to a debate on the possible impacts the liberalization may have on the
Swiss labor market, and in particular on whether new immigrant inflows could generate a
pressure on Swiss wages.
The location of Switzerland in the center of Europe without being a member of the
EU implies that wages can be greatly influenced by trans–border labor markets. One of
these border regions is the Canton Ticino which represents an interesting case of analysis
used here for a quasi–natural experiment. Ticino is a Swiss Canton on the north Italian
border with 160′000 workers (4% of Switzerland) with twice the national share of foreign
workers (41% in 2000 in Ticino, 25% in Switzerland). This is due to the possibility to
employ foreign cross–border commuters coming from the North Italian Provinces2 whose
share in the foreign employment3 in Ticino is 50% as shown in Table 3.1. This category
of foreign workers has never been limited by quotas but regulated through geographical
restrictions. Cross–border commuters must reside in a bounded region of no more than
30 km from the Swiss border line4. Moreover, they can be employed only in a predefined
Swiss border area5, we call it the “Open Area” (A) where cross-border commuters can
1The national priority has been abolished in June 2004 while the quotas will be abolished in
June 2007.
2Como, Varese, Verbano–Cusio–Ossola and Lecco.
3It is possible to distinguish two groups of foreigners, cross–border commuters and resident
immigrants. The latest group includes all the immigrant categories (permanents and short term
immigrants).
4A North-Italian worker must reside in the Italian border region at least 6 month previous to
the application for cross–border working permit.
5A cross–border commuter who resides in Northern Italy is allowed to work only in the south
part of Switzerland.
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compete with local workers, and distinguish it from the “Closed Area”6 (B). Inside the
area A, it is also possible to distinguish centers7 (A1) from the rest of the Open Area (A2),
as depicted in Figure 3.1.
The neighboring Italian Provinces represent an “infinite” source of manpower for Ti-
cino8, that can be attracted by existing wage differentials. Due to the similar cultures
between Ticino and the Italian Provinces (same language, and similar educational sys-
tems) the human capital is easily transferable. However, as can be shown from Table 3.1
cross–border commuters earn, ceteris paribus, 5% less than Swiss workers. For these rea-
sons, the Canton Ticino’s situation represents an interesting extreme case of analysis in
view of a complete liberalization of the Swiss labor market.
The main purpose of this paper is to measure the pressure of cross–border commuters
on the wage of the local labor supply through the geographical regulatory discontinuity. If
cross–border commuters are in competition with the local workforce in the Open Area, they
generate a downward wage pressure that can be observed measuring the wage differential
between local workers employed in the Open and Closed Areas9. Moreover, I would like
to understand which group among Swiss and resident immigrants10 is more likely to suffer
from the cross–border commuters competition.
Authors as Borjas et al. (1997) and Borjas (2003) have widely criticized approaches
exploiting the fact that immigrants tend to cluster in a small number of geographical areas
as in Grossman (1982) and Card (1990), because important problems related to the
immigration endogeneity and internal mobility can lead to underestimate the net effect of
immigration providing evidence of small and even irrelevant impacts on natives as surveyed
by Friedberg and Hunt (1995). However, Canton Ticino resembles a closed economy in
terms of intra–national mobility because it represents an Italian–language minority in
6The Closed Area is defined by all the communes located north of the communities of Preonzo
and Claro. All the remaining regions in Ticino are open to cross–border commuters.
7Centers include the cities of Bellinzona, Chiasso, Locarno, Lugano and Mendrisio.
8The employment basin of the neighboring Italian Provinces counts around 1 million workers
that can potentially apply for a cross–border commuter working permit.
9Sheldon (2000) argues that “although Swiss law prohibits paying foreigners less than the going
wage, employers may circumvent this regulation by appropriate job down–grading so that in the
final analysis foreign labor recruitment in fact does lower the wages of native workers”.
10In Switzerland there are two groups of foreign workers: cross–border commuters and resident
immigrants.
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Switzerland11 and this imposes an important barrier to intra–national mobility.
Nevertheless, in response to the cross–border wage pressures local labor supply may
move to the Closed Area equalizing wages across regions. The Closed Area is a periphery
region with accessibility problems due to the morphology of the region, and with 6%
of total Ticino employment. As can be shown from Table 3.1, the commuting balance
among areas (not considering cross–border commuters) is positive only in centers (area
A1) because they attract workers from the other regions (areas A2 and B), while there
is no evidence that local workers move to the protected region (B). Table 3.1 shows also
that 69% of cross–border commuters are employed in non–center area A2, but they do
not show significant wage differentials among the areas A1 and A2. As a consequence, in
order to identify the cross–border pressure, I will focus on the comparison between local
worker wages among the areas A2 and B to avoid the immigration endogeneity issue as
well as the local labor mobility problem.
The impact of immigration in Switzerland has been analyzed by several authors. Fol-
lowing production theory developed by Christensen et al. (1971), applications to the
Swiss case have been provided by Butare and Favarger (1992) and by Sheldon (2000)
finding that immigrants have little negative effects on Swiss workers’ wages. Authors as
Golder and Straubhaar (1999) provide evidence that immigrants tend to have a negative
impact on the Swiss economy.
In the U.S. context, a more recent contribution by Ottaviano and Peri (2006), devel-
oping a general equilibrium framework in an extension of Borjas (2003), concluded that
in presence of differentiated labor, the inflow of immigrants belonging to a certain group
can be expected to have asymmetric impacts on the wage of different native groups: a
negative effect on groups with substitutable characteristics and a positive effect on groups
with complementary characteristics. This paper focuses on the expected negative effect
cross–border commuters may have on local labor supply, because the intention of the au-
thor is to identify which group of the local labor force may be more susceptible to suffer
from negative consequences, and to quantify this penalty.
11There are four official languages in Switzerland and Canton Ticino is the only Swiss Canton
whose official language is the Italian.
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For these reasons, this paper develops a different approach exploiting the specificities
of the Swiss labor market and in particular the cross–border commuter regulatory discon-
tinuity. I show evidence of significant wage disparities between low skill workers employed
in the two regions A2 and B. Only a small group of Swiss workers seem to be affected by
this pressure because the cross–border commuters attracted in Ticino are low skilled and
therefore more similar to resident immigrants.
In what follows, I describe the empirical model, present the data used in the analy-
sis and show some descriptive statistics. Then, after presenting the estimated results, I
conclude with some reflections.
3.2 Empirical model
In order to measure the pressure of cross–border commuters on wages in Ticino, I compare
the wage of Swiss and resident immigrant workers across the regulatory discontinuity
defined by the Open and Closed Area ignoring the “core–periphery” forces that may led
to underestimate the wage pressure.
As a consequence, the “Open Area” has been subdivided in two regions: the centers
(A1) and the rest of the Open Area (A2), because the area A2 is similar to the Closed
Area (region B) except for the presence of the cross–border commuters. Then, I focus on
the comparison among workers employed in area A2 and workers occupied in the area B.
I separate the effects on resident immigrants from those observed for Swiss workers
in order to understand which group is more likely to be subject to the trans–border
competition. Therefore, I obtain 3 regions (A1, A2 and B) and two groups of workers
(Swiss = S and resident immigrants = F ), and from their interactions I construct the
following region–nationality categories: A1s, A1f , A2s, A2f and Bs, Bf .
In order to compare equally skilled workers across areas, following Borjas (2003), I
define skill groups in terms of both schooling and labor market experience, because work-
ers within the same educational level, but with different levels of experience, are imperfect
substitutes in production. Thereafter, partitioning workers among 5 educational achieve-
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ment groups (College, High School, Apprenticeship, Compulsory and Other degrees12) and
5 experience categories (from 0 to 10, from 11 to 20, from 21 to 30, from 31 to 40 and
more than 40 years) I estimate the following log wage equation (considering the sample of
Swiss and resident immigrants):
lnwi = α+
5∑
k=1
5∑
m=1
γskm.A2
s
kmi +
5∑
k=1
5∑
m=1
γfkm.A2
f
kmi +
+
5∑
k=1
5∑
m=1
φskm.A1
s
kmi +
5∑
k=1
5∑
m=1
φfkm.A1
f
kmi +
+
5∑
k=1
5∑
m=2
ηkmdkmi + µFi +X ′β + i (3.1)
where lnwi is the log natural monthly wage for worker i, α is the constant term, while
A2nkmi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual i working in the non–centers
of the Open Area with nationality n (= Swiss, foreign immigrant) has the education
achievement k and is in the experience group m. Similarly, A1nkmi is an indicator for
individuals working in cities located in the Open Area.
In Equation (3.1), dkmi is “education” nested with “experience”, Fi is “nationality”
(that equals 1 for foreign immigrants), whilst the vector X represents other observables
that describe individual socioeconomic characteristics, job specificities and firm character-
istics.
The parameters of interests are γskm and γ
f
km. These parameters measure the wage
differential within education group k and experience group m for each nationality group
across areas A2 and B. A negative and significant sign of the γnkm will be interpreted
as cross-border downward wage pressure on the local labor supply group for the km skill
category.
Including dkmi, Fi and the A1nkm in Equation (3.1) ensures that the γ
n
km capture the
wage differentials relative to workers within the same nationality–skill group across the
regulatory discontinuity defined by the two areas A2 and B.
The parameters φnkm will capture the wage differentials between the centers in the
12It is important to note that, ceteris paribus, workers with an apprenticeship are more skilled
respect to workers with a compulsory schooling level.
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Open Area (A1) and the Closed Area (B) for each nationality–skill group, and it will
be possible to compute the wage differentials between all the areas considered for each
nationality–skill group. Nevertheless, all the earning differences relative to the A1 include
both the core–periphery as well the cross–border effects that are not singularly identifiable.
I would expect that the coefficients γskm and γ
f
km would be negative and significant for
those km–skill segment groups that are more likely to be in competition with cross–border
commuters, otherwise I would expect that they do not significantly differ from zero.
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis is based on data from the Swiss Wage Structure Survey13 (or
SWSS), that provides cross section data for 2000, 2002 and 2004. The survey has been
implemented by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) among a representative sam-
ple of 5’000 firms (with more than two employees) reporting salaries, job characteristics
and individual attributes of 110’000 individual workers in Ticino (for the three years).
I dispose of a SWSS’ sample that includes only firms active in the private sectors, and
have selected those individual observations which include all the variables used in the
wage equations. The result is a representative sample of 105′507 individual observations
of occupied workers.
The dataset provides gross nominal monthly standardized logarithm of wages in Swiss
Francs14, human capital characteristics in the form of age, education (higher education
degree achieved), potential experience15 and years of tenure in the current firm. I also have
information on gender, marital status, part time work, four type of contracts (different
union coverage), work permits for foreigners, task required by firms, hierarchical level,
firm sizes, sectors and occupations (according to a classification proposed by the SFSO).
In addition, for each worker the zip code of the employment location is available.
13In German the survey is called “Schweizerische Lohnstrukturerhebung (LSE)”.
14The SFSO provides individual October’s gross wage in Swiss Francs standardized to 4 and 1/3
weeks at 40 hours and including 1/12 of annual bonus where applicable.
15In order to compute years of potential experience, as age minus years of schooling minus six,
the categorical variable describing education has been transformed attributing the years necessary
to achieve the respective degree.
64 USI
Oscar Gonzalez 3.3. Data and descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics for selected variables16 for each of the na-
tionality group (cross–border commuters, Swiss and resident immigrants) by areas.
Comparing the nationality groups among areas, cross–border commuters show similar
average wages among areas A1 and A217. Cross–border commuters also represent the
group with the lowest salary, whilst Swiss workers are the group with the highest wage
levels. Swiss and foreign immigrants earn, on average, more in the area A1 than in the
area A2. However, Swiss workers show very similar salaries among the areas A2 and B
while resident immigrants employed in the protected area earn 5% more than in the area
A2.
It is interesting to observe that cross–border commuters show quite similar human
capital distributions among the open areas. On the other hand, Swiss and resident immi-
grants appear more skilled in the centers of the Open Area where higher shares of workers
with a college or high school degree can be founded as compared to the rest of the Open
Area.
The distribution by educational achievements shows that 60% of cross–border com-
muters own a compulsory scholar degree and slightly less than 20% an apprenticeship
diploma. Similar shares are found for resident immigrants with the same educational lev-
els, specially in the Closed Area (B). Differently, Swiss workers are more likely to own
an apprenticeship than a compulsory degree. In fact, from 15% to 17% of Swiss workers
employed respectively in area B and A2 own a compulsory degree, while in the region A2
54% of Swiss workers have an apprenticeship, and the share in the same category rises to
64% in the Closed Area. This emphasizes how cross–border commuters are more similar
to resident immigrants than to Swiss workers in terms of education.
Native workers also show lower average years of experience than immigrants and cross-
borders, probably due to migration decision process. In particular, cross–borders and
resident immigrants are underrepresented in the experience category with less than ten
years.
16A detailed descriptive table with all the variables included in the model is available from the
author on request.
17T-test of equal mean shows that cross–border commuters mean wages are statistically equal
among the two areas A1 and A2 at the 99% level. The detailed results are available from the
author.
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Finally, the distribution by sectors reveals that cross–border commuters are overrepre-
sented in manufacturing activities. In the area A2 50% of them are employed in industries
which is more than twice the share observed for Swiss workers. On the other hand, the
share of foreign immigrants in the manufacturing sector rises from 23% in the area A2 to
31% in the Closed Area. 21% of cross–borders are employed in the construction sector
where Swiss workers represents 9% in the area A2 and 20% in the Closed Area (B).
In synthesis, cross–border commuters are overrepresented in educational category with
compulsory degree and in intermediate levels of experience. Moreover, they are likely to
be employed in manufacturing and construction activities.
3.4 Estimation results
Table 3.3 shows the estimation results when comparing each nationality–skill group across
areas taking the workers employed in the Closed Area as reference. The main interest is
in the comparison among the areas A2 and B in order to capture the wage pressure of
cross–border commuters for each skill segment defined by the education and experience
group. Therefore, Table 3.3 shows the coefficients associated to the non-cities part of the
Open Area (A2) for each skill group in two columns, one for Swiss and one for foreign
immigrants18. The table reports the results of four estimates for which the covariates have
been subsequently added to the model. The first equation, i.e. the first two columns, shows
the results when controlled for skill-nationality groups, year, education and experience,
nationality and socioeconomic characteristics (gender, marital status and tenure). The
second equation includes also job specificities (hierarchical level, task levels, part–time
work, type of contract and occupations). The third model includes firm characteristics
(two digit sectors and firm size) while the last regression (i.e. the fourth) represents a
model with all the variables and some interactions.
In general, the results confirm the intuition that the category of workers most subject
to cross–border commuters competition shows negative and significant wage differentials
across the regulatory discontinuity. More in detail, high skill workers (i.e. with a college
18A detailed table is available from the author on request.
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or a high school degree) do not show significant wage penalties if employed in the area
A2 as compared to those employed in the Closed Area (B) for any experience category,
and the results are robust with respect to the introduction of control variables. Foreign
workers with a college degree and more than 41 years of experience as well as high school
workers in the experience category 21–30 (both Swiss and foreigners) show positive wage
differentials across the areas. Considering workers with an apprenticeship, only workers
with low experience (less than 10 years) show negative wage penalties that are robust even
when introducing interaction terms. The wage penalties observed across areas for this skill
category of workers, both Swiss and foreigners, range from 2% to 5%.
Furthermore, workers with only a compulsory educational degree show negative and
significant wage differentials. For Swiss workers the penalties are lower than for resident
immigrants, and in the full model (the third regression) negative and significant coefficients
are found in the intermediate experience groups (i.e. from 11 to 40 years of experience).
It can be observed that the wage differential increases with experience, while adding
interactions reduces the gap and the coefficient associated to the experience category 11-20
is no longer significantly different from zero. The resulting wage gap for Swiss workers with
a compulsory educational degree range from 3% to 6%. Considering resident immigrants
with more than 10 years of experience, they show significant negative coefficients that
fluctuate between 5% to 7.5%. These results are still robust regarding the introduction
of covariates even if the magnitudes of the differentials decrease. Also in this case, the
penalties increase with experience but decrease for skill groups with more than 40 years
of experience.
3.5 Conclusions
The objective of the paper is to verify if cross–border commuters generate a pressure
on the wages of Swiss and resident immigrant workers in Ticino. This is a particular
labor market with high levels of foreign workers and a regulatory discontinuity across
two inside areas. The possibility to distinguish two areas where cross–border commuters
can or cannot be employed is the key to the analysis. Comparing the wages of each of
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the Swiss and resident immigrants categories across regions A2 and B I found evidence
of wage differentials between local low skill workers employed in the two areas. These
groups are subject to the competition of cross–border commuters. However, this seems
to affect only a relatively small group of Swiss workers while resident foreigners are more
likely to be subject to the cross–border competition. No evidence is found for high skill
workers of cross–border pressure, but in some isolated cases I found a positive wage gap for
intermediate experience categories. The structure of the Swiss workforce is more skilled
and it seems that this category of manpower has been protected by the old regulation.
Consequently, it is not obvious what the impact of the liberalization on this skilled group
would be.
Finally, this study permits to reflect upon the possible impacts the liberalization may
have on the Swiss labor market. The Canton Ticino represents an extreme case of analysis
where a high concentration of cross–border commuters produces only small effects on
natives, but the impact on other foreign categories of workers could be more problematic.
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3.6 Figures
Figure 3.1: Scheme of Canton Ticino
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B
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Ticino labor market specificities
Permits Adj. wage Adj. wage Permits distribution across areas
distrib. diff. diff.
A1-A2
Ticino Coeff. Coeff. Open Area Closed Area
(std. err.) (std. err.) A1 A2 B
Swiss 59% - 46% 47% 7%
Resident immigrants 23% -0.005 40% 53% 8%
(0.0029)
Cross-borders 19% -0.048** -0.006 31% 69% 0%
(0.0028) (0.0030)
Total 100% 42% 53% 6%
(absolute values) (161167) (67163) (84791) (9213)
Commuting balance+
over area tot. employment 42% -32% -17%
Observations 105507 27397
R2 0.65 0.69
Note: The data are from the Swiss 2000 census provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. + Com-
muting balance without cross–border commuters. In the two regressions, dependent variable is log monthly wage,
robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Area A1 includes the cities of
Bellinzona, Chiasso, Locarno, Lugano and Mendrisio.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistic of selected variables
Cross–borders Swiss Resident immigrants
A1 A2 A1 A2 B A1 A2 B
lnw 8.32 8.32 8.62 8.53 8.52 8.45 8.39 8.44
Age 39.76 40.65 39.30 40.03 38.63 39.67 39.91 40.84
Schooling 10.73 10.68 12.70 12.27 12.16 11.54 11.07 10.72
Experience 23.03 23.97 20.61 21.76 20.47 22.13 22.84 24.12
Tenure 9.08 9.09 8.74 9.10 9.64 7.05 7.42 8.55
College 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.02
High School 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.04
Apprenticeship 0.19 0.18 0.53 0.54 0.64 0.26 0.26 0.24
Compulsory 0.59 0.61 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.45 0.53 0.61
Other Schools 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.09
Exp 0-10 0.12 0.09 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.14
Exp 11-20 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.27
Exp 21-30 0.29 0.32 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.29
Exp 31-40 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.22
Exp more 40 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09
Manufacturing 0.39 0.50 0.10 0.27 0.25 0.11 0.23 0.31
Construction 0.21 0.21 0.07 0.09 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.35
Wholesale & retail 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.25 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.08
Hotels 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.22 0.21 0.08
Financial sector 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.00
Real estate & renting 0.07 0.03 0.21 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.09
Observations 8542 18855 23267 24082 2318 11069 15407 1967
Note: A detailed table with mean of all the variables included in the model is available from the
author by request.
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Table 3.3: Estimation results, Swiss and resident immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Swiss Foreign Swiss Foreign Swiss Foreign Swiss Foreign
College
Exp 0-10 -0.012 -0.043 0.039 0.004 0.06 0.016 0.033 0.002
(0.051) (0.055) (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044)
Exp 11-20 -0.031 0.037 -0.014 0.037 0.004 0.048 0.015 0.054
(0.050) (0.054) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.049) (0.051)
Exp 21-30 0.162 0.126 0.115 0.09 0.128 0.104 0.154 0.128
(0.119) (0.120) (0.097) (0.098) (0.096) (0.097) (0.099) (0.099)
Exp 31-40 0.094 0.280+ 0.076 0.184 0.08 0.175 0.062 0.159
(0.159) (0.168) (0.127) (0.132) (0.114) (0.120) (0.114) (0.120)
Exp more 41 -0.034 0.490** -0.059 0.389* -0.082 0.344** -0.152 0.285**
(0.125) (0.142) (0.153) (0.162) (0.115) (0.121) (0.105) (0.108)
High School
Exp 0-10 0.025 0.037 -0.015 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.001 -0.002
(0.044) (0.058) (0.034) (0.046) (0.027) (0.040) (0.029) (0.040)
Exp 11-20 0.028 -0.032 -0.009 -0.05 0.016 -0.043 0.015 -0.044
(0.040) (0.046) (0.034) (0.039) (0.036) (0.040) (0.034) (0.039)
Exp 21-30 0.127* 0.166** 0.077 0.131** 0.092* 0.124** 0.103* 0.136**
(0.057) (0.059) (0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049)
Exp 31-40 0.17 0.158 0.091 0.106 0.103 0.101 0.088 0.088
(0.115) (0.125) (0.081) (0.089) (0.076) (0.082) (0.079) (0.085)
Exp more 41 0.147 -0.044 0.127 0.000 0.099 -0.024 0.114 -0.045
(0.092) (0.103) (0.089) (0.095) (0.088) (0.093) (0.094) (0.097)
Apprenticeship
Exp 0-10 -0.012 -0.027+ -0.041** -0.051** -0.020+ -0.034* -0.035** -0.039**
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
Exp 11-20 0.032** -0.005 0.012 -0.019 0.021+ -0.012 0.013 -0.019
(0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014)
Exp 21-30 0.007 -0.017 -0.031* -0.049** -0.006 -0.034* -0.004 -0.031+
(0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016)
Exp 31-40 0.044* -0.032 0.016 -0.025 0.032+ -0.015 0.025 -0.022
(0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020)
Exp more 41 0.061 -0.008 0.026 -0.014 0.034 -0.004 0.035 -0.003
(0.049) (0.069) (0.047) (0.067) (0.043) (0.064) (0.042) (0.065)
Compulsory
Exp 0-10 -0.02 -0.068+ -0.038 -0.054 -0.014 -0.021 -0.011 -0.019
(0.043) (0.041) (0.038) (0.035) (0.036) (0.032) (0.039) (0.036)
Exp 11-20 -0.028 -0.067** -0.034* -0.060** -0.032+ -0.050** -0.026 -0.048**
(0.021) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011)
Exp 21-30 -0.048* -0.083** -0.046** -0.065** -0.045** -0.051** -0.035* -0.043**
(0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
Exp 31-40 -0.085** -0.098** -0.062** -0.082** -0.066** -0.075** -0.049** -0.062**
(0.023) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
Exp more 41 -0.089** -0.109** -0.013 -0.048* -0.018 -0.037+ -0.014 -0.042*
(0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018)
Constant 8.331** 8.277** 8.162** 8.134**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.032)
Years-EduExp-Foreign Y Y Y Y
Socioec. Chars Y Y Y Y
Job Y Y Y
Firm Y Y
Interactions Y
Observations 78110 78110 78110 78110
R-squared 0.46 0.60 0.64 0.67
Note: Dependent variable is log monthly wage. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%;
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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